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Abstract:
This article reviews the application of several IP rights (copyright, patent, sui generis database right, data exclusivity and trade secret) to Big Data. Beyond the protection of software used to collect and process Big Data corpora, copyright's traditional role is challenged by the relatively unstructured nature of the non-relational (noSQL) databases typical of Big Data corpora. This also impacts the application of the EU sui generis right in databases. Misappropriation (tort-based) or anti-parasitic behaviour protection might apply, where available, to data generated by AI systems that has high but short-lived value. Copyright in material contained in Big Data corpora must also be considered. Exceptions for Text and Data Mining (TDM) are already in place in a num-
A. Introduction
1 The interfaces between "Big Data" (as the term is defined below) and IP matters both because of the impact of Intellectual Property (IP) rights in Big Data, and because IP rights might interfere with the generation, analysis and use of Big Data. This Article looks at both sides of the interface coin, focusing on several IP rights, namely copyright, patent, data exclusivity and trade secret/confidential information. 1 The paper does not discuss trade marks in any detail, although the potential role of Artificial Intelligence (AI), using Big Data corpora, 2 in designing and selecting trade marks certainly seems a topic worthy of further discussion. 3 
B. Defining Big Data
2 The term "Big Data" can be defined in a number of ways. A common way to define it is to enumerate its three essential features, a fourth that, though not essential, is increasingly typical, and a fifth that is derived from the other three (or four). Those features are: volume, veracity, velocity, variety, 2 This use of the term "corpus" in this context is an extension of its original meaning as either a "body or complete collection of writings or the like; the whole body of literature on any subject", or the "body of written or spoken material upon which a linguistic analysis is based". Oxford English Dictionary Online (accessed 21 December 2018).
There is a debate about the proper form of the plural. Both Oxford and Merriam-Webster indicate that "corpora" is the proper form, although the author has encountered the form "corpuses" in the literature discussing Big Data. See e.g., the 2014 White House report to the President from the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology titled "Big Data and Privacy: A Technological Perspective", at x. "Corpora" is the form chosen here, although the predicable future is that the perhaps more intuitive form "corpuses" will win this linguistic tug-of-war.
3
For example, AI systems can create correlations between trademark features (look, sound etc.) and their appeal, thus allowing the creation and selection of "better" marks. 1
insights can be used for multiple purposes, including advertising targeting and surveillance, though an almost endless array of other applications is possible. To take just one different example of a lesser known application, a law firm might process hundreds or thousands of documents in a given field, couple ML with human expertise, and produce insights about how they and other firms operate, for example in negotiating a certain type of transaction or settling (or not) cases.
5 A subset of machine learning known as deep learning (DL) uses neural network, a computer system modelled on the human brain. 11 This implies that any human contribution to the output of deep learning systems is "second degree". When considering the possible IP protection of outputs of such systems, this separation between humans and the output challenges core notions of IP law, especially authorship in copyright law and inventorship in patent law.
C. Framing the issues
6 ML and DL can produce high value outputs. Such outputs can take the form of analyses, insights, correlations, and may lead to automated (machine) decision-making. It can be expected that those who generate this value will try to capture and protect it, using IP law, technological measures and contracts. One can also expect competitors and the public to try to access those outputs for the same reason, namely their value.
7 How far should IP go to protect value generated by ML? The old adage that "if it is worth copying it is worth protecting" has long been discarded. 12 A more nuanced question to ask might be, do entities that collect, process and use Big Data need IP incentives or deserve additional rewards to do what they do. Is protecting Big Data corpora and their processing outputs comparable to providing an incentive for trees to grow leaves in the spring? Specifically, does the creation of incentives help generate new or better data corpora, analyses, and thus produce welfare increases, taking account of welfare losses that rights in Big Data might cause, such as increased transaction and licensing costs?
11 With "deep learning model, the algorithms can determine on their own if a prediction is accurate or not… through its own method of computing -its own 'brain', if you will" Brett Grossfeld, 'A simple way to understand machine learning vs deep learning', ZenDesk (18 July 2017), online: <https://www.zendesk.com/blog/machine-learning-anddeep-learning/>. 14 10 The creation of (potentially massive amounts of) new literary and artistic material without direct human input will challenge human-created works in the marketplace. This is already happening with machine-written news reports. 15 Deciding whether machine-created material should be protected by copyright could thus have a profound impact on the market for creative works. If machine created material is copyright-free, machines will produce free goods that compete with paid ones, that is, those created by humans expecting a financial return. If the material produced by machines is protected by copyright and its use potentially subject to payment, this might level the commercial playing field between human and machine, but then who (which natural or legal person) should be paid for the computer's work? Then there will be border definition issues. Some works will be created by human and machine working together. Can we apply the notion of joint authorship? Or should we consider the machineproduced portion (if separable) copyright-free, thus limiting the protection to identifiably humanauthored portions? 1 11 If such major doctrinal challenges-each with embedded layers of normative inquiries-emerge in the field of copyright, Big Data poses existential threats in the case of patents. AI tools can be used to process thousands of published patents and patent applications and used to expand the scope of claims in patent applications. This poses normative challenges that parallel those enunciated above: who is the inventor? Is there a justification to grant an exclusive right to a machine-made invention? To whom? Then there are doctrinal ones as well. For example, is the machine-generated "invention" disclosed in such a way that would warrant the issuance of a patent?
12 It gets more complicated, however. If AI machines using patent-related Big Data can broaden claim scope or add claims in patent applications, then within a short horizon they could be able to predict the next incremental steps in a given field of activity by analysing innovation trajectories. For example, they might look at the path of development of a specific item (car brakes, toothbrushes) and "predict" or define a broad array or what could come next. Doctrinally, this raises questions about inventive step: If a future development is obvious to a machine, is it obvious for purposes of patent law? Answering this question poses an epistemological as well as a doctrinal challenge for patent offices. The related normative inquiry is the one mentioned above, namely whether machine-made inventions (even inventions the scope [claims] of which were merely "stretched" using Big Data and AI) "deserve" a patent despite their obviousness (to the machine).
13 This use of patent and technological Big Data could lead to a future where machines pre-disclose incremental innovations (and their use) in such a way that they constitute publicly available prior art and thus make obtaining patents impossible on a significant part of the current patentability universe. Perhaps even the best AI system using a Big Data corpus of all published patents and technical literature will not be able to predict the next pioneer invention, but very few patents are granted on ground-breaking advances. AI systems that can predict most currently patented inventions, (which tend to be only incrementally different from the prior art) would wreak havoc with the patentbased incentive system. 
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The unavailability of patents would dramatically increase the role of data exclusivity rights (the right to prevent reliance in clinical data submitted to obtain marketing approval) in the pharmaceutical field.
17 If this prediction of future inventions by AI became an established practice in fields where this (separate) protection by data exclusivity is unavailable, the very existence of the incentive system based on patents could be in jeopardy.
16
In the pages that follow, the Article takes a deeper look at each of these challenges and draws the contours of possible answers.
D. Copyright
17 Let us get an easy point out of the analytical picture at the outset: the human-written (AI) software used to collect (including search and social media apps), store and analyse Big Data corpora is considered a literary work eligible for copyright protection, subject to possible exclusions and limitations. 18 The analysis that follows focuses on the harder question of the protection of the Big Data corpora and of the outputs generated from the processing of such corpora.
18 Before we delve more deeply into the interface between Big Data and copyright, it is necessary briefly to review briefly a fundamental element of copyright law, namely originality. Creative choices need not be artistic or aesthetic in nature, but it seems they do have to be human.
I. The Key Role of Originality

26
Relevant choices are reflected in the particular way an author describes, explains, illustrates, or embodies his or her creative contribution. In contrast, choices that are merely routine (e.g. the choice to organize a directory in alphabetical order) or significantly constrained by external factors such as the function a work is intended to serve (e.g. providing accurate driving directions), the tools used to produce it (e.g. a sculptor's marble and chisel), and the practices or conventions standard to a particular type of work (e.g. the structure of a sonnet) are not creative for the purpose of determining the existence of a sufficient degree of originality.
22 When the Berne Convention text was last revised on substance in 1967, 27 neither publicly available "electronic" databases nor any mass-market database software was available. The "collections" referred to in the Convention are thus of the type mentioned by the Convention drafters: (paper-based) anthologies and encyclopaedias. The negotiators' objective was to create a separate copyright for the maker (or "arranger") of a collection, knowing that most if not all of the entries in the collection (say, an encyclopaedia) were written by third parties, each an expert in her or his own field and each entitled to his or her own copyright in the entry. In a collection of this type, there are thus two layers of copyright; first, a right in each entry, and in each illustration or photograph, which is either transferred or licensed to the maker or publisher of the collection; and, second, a copyright in what one might call the "organizational layer", granted to the maker of the collection based on the "selection or arrangement" of the individual entries, photographs and illustrations. The second layer-the collection such as encyclopaedia-is generally treated as a collective work. 24 The data in typical (relational or "SQL") databases in existence in the 1990s generally was "structured" in some way, for example via an index, and that structure might qualify the database for (thin) copyright protection in the database's organizational layer. Older databases also contained more limited datasets ("small data").
25 Facebook, Google, and Amazon, to name just those three, found out early on that relational databases were not a good solution for the volumes and types of data that they were dealing with. This inadequacy explains the development of open source software (OSS) for Big Data: the Hadoop file system, the MapReduce programming language, and associated non-relational ("noSQL") databases such as Apache's Cassandra. 31 These tools and the corpora they helped create and use may not qualify for protection as "databases" under the SQL-derived criteria mentioned above. This does not mean that no work or knowhow is required to create the corpus, but that the type of structure of the dataset may not of the United States Code) defines "collective work" as "a work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole". 26 Indeed, Big Data is sometimes defined in direct contrast to the notion of SQL database and reflected in the TRIPS Agreement (and the EU database directive discussed in the next section). A McKinsey report, for example, notes that "Big Data" referred to "datasets whose size is beyond the ability of typical database software tools to capture, store, manage, and analyse." 33 Those data are often generated automatically but at times less so, as when Google scanned millions of books for its massive book scanning project. 34 This was a most ambitious project but copyright "got in the way", especially for access to the corpus outside the United States: 27 Big Data software is unlikely to "select or arrange" the data in a way that would meet the originality criterion and trigger copyright protection. In the Google Books case, the database basically consists of word-searchable scans of the books. From a copyright standpoint, therefore, it is doubtful whether a Big Data corpus of this sort, or a "dump" of, say, personal data scraped from online search engines or social media sites, would benefit from copyright protection. Hacking and other methods of unauthorised access to such corpora might be better handled via computer crimes and torts. 47 This right is not subject to the originality requirement. 48 The Directive refers to the database maker's investment in "obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents" and then provides a right "to prevent extraction and/or re-utilization of the whole or of a substantial part, evaluated qualitatively and/or quantitatively, of the contents of that database."
49 The directive also mentions in its recitals that a database includes "collections of independent works, data or other materials which are systematically or methodically arranged and can be individually accessed." 50 This, according to Professor Bernt Hugenholtz, "squarely rules out protection - 49 Directive (n 22), art 7(1).
50 Ibid, recital 7. 1 whether by copyright or by the sui generis right -of (collections of) raw machine-generated data." 51 The use of noSQL technologies may mean that Big Data corpora are not protected by the sui generis right. It also seems fair to say that the machine produced outputs (such as new data corpora) based on analyses of Big Data are neither "obtained" nor "collected"; they are generated by the machine. This would seem to leave them unprotected by the sui generis right.
32
The Database Directive also mentions, however, that if there is an investment in obtaining the data, that investment may be sufficient for the corpus to qualify as a database. 52 "Recitals 10-12 preceding the Directive illustrate that the principal reason for introducing the sui generis right was to promote investment in the (then emerging) European database sector". 53 If the directive were applied to Big Data corpora, then crawling through the data might constitute prohibited "extraction" unless it was minimal.
54
33 While this matter cannot be fully investigated here, there are serious doubts about the power of this argument to justify the application of the directive to Big Data corpora. The Court of Justice of the European Union defined "investment" in obtaining the data as "resources used to seek out existing materials and collect them in the database but does not cover the resources used for the creation of materials which make up the contents of a database." 55 Professor Hugenholtz explained that "the main argument for this distinction, as is transparent from the decision, is that the Database Directive's economic rationale is to promote and reward investment in database production, not in generating new data".
56 This casts doubt on whether the notion of investment is sufficient to warrant sui generis protection of Big Data corpora, though Matthias Leistner suggested caution in opining that the "the sweeping conclusion 56 Hugenholtz (n 27).
that all sensor-or other machine-generated data will typically not be covered by the sui generis right is not warranted".
57
34 Arguably, indirect confirmation that "Big Data" corpora are protected neither by copyright nor by the sui generis right in database may be found in a Commission staff document accompanying a 2017 Communication from the Commission in which the idea was floated to create a data producer's right.
58
The Staff document noted that 37 Four examples should suffice to illustrate the point.
The German Copyright Act contains an exception for the "automatic analysis of large numbers of works (source material) for scientific research" for non-commercial purposes. 63 A corpus may be made available to "a specifically limited circle of persons for their joint scientific research, as well as to individual third persons for the purpose of monitoring the quality of scientific research."
64 The corpus must also be deleted once the research has been completed. The reproduction must be from lawful sources.
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The UK statute provides for a right to make a copy of a work "for computational analysis of anything recorded in the work," but prohibits, however, dealing with the copy in other ways and makes contracts that would prevent or restrict the making of a copy for the purpose stated above unenforceable.
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40 Finally, the Japanese statute contains an exception for the reproduction or adaptation of a work to the extent deemed necessary "the purpose of information analysis ('information analysis' means to extract information, concerned with languages, • Whether the exception applies to only one (reproduction) or all rights (including adaptation/derivation);
• Whether contractual overrides are possible;
• Whether the material used should be from a lawful source;
• What dissemination of the data, if any, is possible; and
• Whether the purpose of TDM is non-commercial.
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The answers to all five questions can be grounded in a normative approach, but they should be set against the backdrop of the three-step test, which, as explained below, is likely to apply to any copyright exception or limitation.
43 Before taking a look at the five points in greater detail, it is worth recalling that there are other types of exceptions that might allow TDM in specific instances, such as general exceptions for scientific research and fair use. 
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The last two questions on the list above are somewhat harder. Dissemination of the data, if such data includes copyright works, could be necessary among the people interested in the work. German law makes an exception for a "limited circle of persons for their joint scientific research", and "third persons for the purpose of monitoring the quality of scientific research." 75 This is a reflection of a scientific basis of the exception, which includes project-based work by a limited number of scientists and monitoring by peer reviewers. This would not allow the use of TDM to scan libraries of books and make snippets available to the general public, as Google Books does, for example. An interpretation of the scope of the exception might depend on whether the use is commercial, which in turn might vary according to the definitional approach taken: is it the commercial nature of the entity performing the TDM that matters, or the specific use of the TDM data concerned (i.e., is that specific use monetized)?
48 As of early 2019, the EU was considering a new, mandatory TDM exception as part of its digital copyright reform efforts. 76 Article 3, which contains the proposed TDM exception, has been the focus of intense debates. The September 2018 (Parliament) version of the proposed TDM exception maintains the TDM exception for scientific research proposed by the Commission but adds an optional exception applicable to the private sector, not just for the benefit of public institutions and research organisations.
77
Members of the academic community have criticised the narrow scope of the Commission's proposed exception, which the Parliament's amendments ameliorated. 78 The European Copyright Society opined that "data mining should be permitted for non-commercial research purposes, for research conducted in a commercial context, for purposes of journalism and for any other purpose".
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49 One should note, finally, that when a technological protection measure or "lock" such as those protected by art. 11 of the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty, is in place preventing the use of data contained in copyright works for TDM purposes, the question is whether a TDM exception provides a "right" to perform TDM and thus potentially a right to circumvent the TDM or obtain redress against measures designed to restrict it. 80 This might apply to traffic management (e.g., throttling) measured used to slow the process down. Those questions are worth pondering, but they are difficult to answer, especially at the international level. 
Application of the Three-Step Test
50
The three-step test sets boundaries for exceptions and limitations to copyright rights.
51
The original three-step test is contained in art. 9(2) of the Berne Convention. Its purpose is to allow countries party to the Convention to make exceptions to the right of reproduction (1) "in certain special cases", (2) "provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work", and (3) "does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author". 82 The test was extended to all copyright rights by the TRIPS Agreement, with the difference that the term "author" at the end was replaced with the term "right holder". 53 The first step ("certain special cases") was interpreted to mean that "an exception or limitation must be limited in its field of application or exceptional in its scope. In other words, an exception or limitation should be narrow in quantitative as well as a qualitative sense". 84 The Study Group discussed the possible inclusion of the test in the Berne Convention before the 1967 (Stockholm) revision had opined that the test should require that any exception to the right of reproduction be "for clearly specified purposes". 55 The second step (interference with normal exploitation) was defined as follows. First, exploitation was defined as any use of the work by which the copyright holder tries to extract/ maximize the value of her right. "Normal" is more troublesome. Does it refer to what is simply "common", or does it refer to a normative standard? The question is particularly relevant for new forms and emerging business models that have not, thus far, been common or "normal" in an empirical sense. At the revision of the Berne Convention in Stockholm in 1967, the concept was used to refer to "all forms of exploiting a work, which have, or are likely to acquire, considerable economic or practical importance". 86 In other words, if the exception is used to limit a commercially significant market or, a fortiori, to enter into competition with the copyright holder, the exception is prohibited.
87
56 Could a TDM exception be used to justify scanning and making available entire libraries of books still under active commercial exploitation? The answer is negative, as this would interfere with commercial exploitation. For books still protected by copyright but no longer easily available on a commercial basis, the absence of active commercial exploitation would likely limit the impact of the second step, however, subject to a caveat. Some forms of exploitation are typically done by a third party under license and do not need any active exploitation by the right holder. For example, a film studio might want the right to make a film out of a novel no longer commercially exploited. That may in turn generate new demand for the book. This is still normal exploitation. One must be careful in extending this reasoning too far, for example, and assume that every novel will be turned into a movie.
57 TDM is quite comparable to the not adaptation of a novel to the big screen. Its purpose is not to convey the same or similar expressive creativity via a different medium. TDM is looking, if anything, for ideas embedded in copyright works. Because Big Data corpora used for TDM are necessarily composed of large numbers of works and other data, the TDM function cannot be performed if licensing work by work is required. This is also differs in the case of a film adaptation, a scenario in which it seems reasonable to expect that the author (or her representative) and the film producer might negotiate a license.
58 One way to pass the second step would be for a TDM exception to allow limited uses that do not demonstrably interfere with commercial exploitation, such as those allowed under the German statute. Another example is the use of "snippets" from books scanned by Google for its Google Books project, which was found to be a fair use by the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. This matters not just as a matter of US (state) practice but because at least the fourth fair use factor ("the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work") is a market-based assessment of the impact of the use resembling the three-step test's second step. 88 The Second Circuit noted that this did not mean that the Google Books project would have no impact, but rather that the impact would not be meaningful or significant.
89 It also noted that the type of loss of sale created by TDM "will generally occur in relation to interests that are not protected by the copyright. A snippet's capacity to satisfy a searcher's need for access to a copyrighted book will at times be because the snippet conveys a historical fact that the searcher needs to ascertain." 90 In the same vein, one could argue that the level of interference required to violate the second step of the test must be significant and should be a use that is relevant from the point of view of commercial exploitation.
59
The third step (no unreasonable prejudice to legitimate interests) is perhaps the most difficult to interpret. What is an "unreasonable prejudice", and what are "legitimate interests"? Let us start with the latter. "Legitimate" can mean sanctioned or authorized by law or principle. Alternatively, it can just as well be used to denote something that is "normal" or "regular". The WTO dispute-settlement panel report concluded that the combination of the notion of "prejudice" with that of "interests" pointed clearly towards a legal-normative approach. In other words, "legitimate interests" are those that are protected by law.
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60 Then, what is an "unreasonable" prejudice? The presence of the word "unreasonable" indicates that some level or degree of prejudice is justifiable. Hence, while a country might exempt the making of a small number of private copies entirely, it may be required to impose a compensation scheme, such as a levy, when the prejudice level becomes unjustified.
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The WTO panel concluded that "prejudice to the 88 The fourth fair use factor contained in the US Copyright Act (17 USC s 101) reads as follows: "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." especially on a commercial basis. 97 Unfortunately, patent information is often mired in a difficult language known as "patentese", which obscures the informational function of published patents.
98
An AI-capable TDM system might be able not just to find but also to interpret useful information and facilitate technology transfers.
99 Relatedly, AI and patent information could be combined not just to interpret patent claims but also to determine their validity.
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64 AI applications in this field already go further, however, and the trajectory of their development leads to some potentially remarkable conclusions. First, existing AI-based systems using Big Data (e.g. databases of published patents and technical literature) allow patent applicants to maximize the exclusivity claimed in their patent applications by identifying material analogous to the invention that can also be claimed-essentially variations on the theme of the invention-thus potentially broadening its scope beyond what the applicant actually invented.
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II. Big Data and the future of innovation
65 This section is admittedly at the border between current technology and the future. Part of it is thus speculation based on how current AI systems using patent corpora and AI are likely to evolve. Various options are considered. Hopefully, the reader will find some of it useful.
66
The kind of claim-broadening system described above can be used for a different purpose, namely to disclose (without claiming patent rights) incremental variations on claims of existing patents, thus potentially preventing patenting of improvements and even derivative and incremental inventions in the future. 102 Are AI-generated disclosures of variations on existing inventions or incremental innovations sufficient to defeat novelty? 103 If massive disclosures through AI-systems of incremental variations on existing patents become common, patent courts and offices might be tempted-for both institutional and normative reasons-to limit the patent-defeating power of such disclosures, for example by insisting that they do not sufficiently enable or describe the invention, which would remain patentable, therefore, when an application is filed by a (human) person providing a more complete disclosure. More neutral outcomes might be obtained in higher courts. 107 The notion of "singularity" became well-known after the publication of Ray Kurtzweil's famous 2006 book on the topic. 108 The singularity, according to Kurzweil, will be a reality when computers become more "intelligent" than humans.
109 70 An innovation singularity would compel a fundamental rethink of the innovation incentive system. From a first to disclose (and patent) system, one might need to consider a "first to develop" system. Such a system would lead to a series of both doctrinal and normative questions presupposes that one actually knows whether a human or a machine is the "inventor". If the patent applicant does not need to provide proof of human invention, perhaps courts will require it later on in infringement proceedings and invalidate patents for lack of (human) inventorship.
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The last question in this section is whether there can be patents on AI systems themselves. International patentability criteria are contained in art. 27 of the TRIPS Agreement. This provision leaves World Trade Organization (WTO) members a fair degree of flexibility in determining what constitutes an "invention", and then whether such invention is new, involves an inventive step (or is non-obvious) and is industrially applicable (or useful). 113 The European Patent Office (EPO) issued new Examination Guidelines (in force November 2018) noting that "[a]rtificial intelligence and machine learning are based on computational models and algorithms for classification, clustering, regression and dimensionality reduction, such as neural networks, genetic algorithms, support vector machines, k-means, kernel regression and discriminant analysis", and that ["s]uch computational models and algorithms are per se of an abstract mathematical nature, irrespective of whether they can be 'trained' based on training data". 114 In the United States, algorithms are also essentially unpatentable since the US Supreme Court's decision in Alice v. CLS Bank, which imposed a two-part test that most computer programs are unlikely to pass.
115 The focus is now on the machine: "If the novel feature is the use of a computer, the patent will likely be invalid, while if the novel feature is a better computer, the patent will likely be valid."
116 The role of patents in protecting algorithms thus seems fairly narrow going forward.
III. Localization and working requirements
75 There is a final point, arguably tangential but nonetheless potentially relevant, to be made in connection with patents and Big Data. meant to limit or eliminate the so-called working requirements in patent law, which were legal under previous international rules. 117 This requirement was seen, in a number of (mostly developing) countries as a part of the patent bargain.
118 A patent, as defined in TRIPS, is a right to exclude not conditioned on either availability or manufacture or other use of the patented invention in the territories where a patent is in force.
119 Prior to TRIPS, certain countries imposed a (local) working requirement to make sure that patented inventions would be available (and the technology used) in the country. The TRIPS rationale is, in short, that companies should be able to produce patented inventions wherever they believe it is more efficient and export to other territories. Local working requirements parallels the current clash between personal data protection and (free) trade.
76 This is relevant to Big Data because a common form of personal data protection is data localization. 120 Is the assumption that free trade is a desirable normative goal applicable here? Cross-border data flow limits seem to be a pushing back against free trade.
121 This indirectly imposes a local "working requirement" on AI corpora containing personal data. If IP law is prologue, free trade (i.e. free cross-border data flows) will win that debate. 
F. Data Exclusivity
